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The European Commission's Proposals on
Worker Participation in the European
Economic Community
Marc-Hubert Battaille *
The current trend toward greater worker participation in business deci-
sions is reflected in European Economic Community developments. In this
article, Mr. Battaille examines recent European Commission measures
which attempt to harmonize national company law legislation in the Member
States. The author focuses particularly on the Commission's proposalfor a
Council Directive to ensure the right to information and consultation for
workers of enterprises exercising their activities in more than one establish-
ment or subsidiary in one or several Member States.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the democratic world the demand is growing for
greater public participation in government decision-making processes.
People are increasingly aware that if they want to protect their interests
in society, they need to involve themselves in the processes that govern.
Therefore it is no surprise that in many countries this desire for partici-
pation has carried over into the workplace. In a wage-earning society,
well-being is intrinsically bound up with employment in its broadest
sense, including rates of pay, hours and conditions of work, leisure time
and job satisfaction.
In the past, decision-making in industry has tended to reflect the
interests of management and shareholders, despite the fact that these
decisions often have far-reaching consequences for employees and their
families. Worker participation, often labelled industrial democracy,
* President, Intemationale Public Affairs Centre, Heme-Brussels, Belgium.
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provides a method for ensuring that workers' interests are respected in
the decision-making process.
The ten EEC Member States have varied structures for industrial
decision-making' as a result of their divergent economic, social and
legal development. In some Member States, wage-earners enjoy exten-
sive rights and legal status within their firms, while in others, workers'
rights remain no more than embryonic. 2 This disparity undermines the
Community's stated aim of improving living and working conditions
within the Member States.
As part of the Community objective to create a common market
with a single industrial base, one of the tasks of the European Commis-
sion is to work towards the harmonization of national company law
legislation. The Commission's proposal for a European company stat-
ute, for example, embodies a completely new EEC-wide order of com-
pany law.3 In drawing up its company law proposals, the Commission
examined the roles of those individuals within a firm representing
shareholders' interests (capital) and those representing workers' inter-
ests (labor). Reform of these roles has become all the more urgent
since there has been a development in public companies towards con-
centration of real power in the hands of a few top men, while share-
holders, and often directors, are no longer in a position to exercise
supervision.4
A number of the Member States are in the process of drawing up
plans establishing supervisory boards containing workers' representa-
tives to assert a degree of control over management. The introduction
of a supervisory board, however, is only one of several possible forms
of participation. Although it is often difficult to categorize them, there
are, broadly speaking, four possible means of worker participation:
I See generally Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative Fiew
of Corporate Power in the United States andEurope, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397 (1978), for an over-
view of the laws of corporate organization in several of the EEC countries.
2 A useful summary of the schemes of employee participation found in the EEC countries is
Employee Participation and Company Structure in the European Community, 1975 BLL. E.C.,
Supp. no. 8, at n.21 [hereinafter cited as Green Paper]. See also W. KOLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE
COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978) [hereinafter cited as W. KOLVENBACH (1978)]; W.
KOLVENBACH, WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE (1977); Conlon, Industrial Democracy and
EEC Company Law: .4 Review of the Draft F/?h Directive, 24 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 348 (1975).
3 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies, (amended
proposal presented by the Commission to the Council on May 13, 1975, pursuant to the second
paragraph of article 149 of the EEC Treaty), 1975 BULL. E.C., Supp. no. 4 [hereinafter cited as S.
E. Proposal].
4 For an attempt by two authors to evaluate the traditional legal devices for corporate control




1) collective agreements; 2) worker representation in consultative bod-
ies; 3) appointment of worker directors; and 4) granting of capital
shares to worker-employees.
The European Economic Community has adopted a number of
measures more limited than any of the above listed plans, but neverthe-
less these measures reflect a trend toward greater worker participation
within the company decision-making processes. For example, as part
of its social action program, the Community drew up a Draft Directive
on collective dismissals of workers, which was adopted by the Council
of Ministers (hereinafter referred to as Council) in February, 1975.1
Employers planning such dismissals in the future must first consult
with wbrkers' representatives on the possibility of avoiding or reducing
lay-offs and mitigating their consequences. Workers' representatives
must be fully informed of the circumstances surrounding redundancies
and plans to eliminate positions must be communicated in advance to
the competent public authority.6 Dismissals generally may not take ef-
fect until a period of 30 days has elapsed from the employer's an-
nouncement, during which time the public authority is empowered to
seek solutions to the situation.
The Commission has likewise drawn up a Directive to safeguard
employees' rights in the event of mergers and takeovers, which was
adopted by the Council on February 14, 1977. 7 Under this Directive,
before a merger takes place, workers' representatives must be informed
of the reasons for the merger, the consequences it will have for wage
earners and measures to be taken on their behalf.' If the workers con-
cerned request, discussions must be opened "in good time" with a view
to seeking agreement regarding any measures to be taken on their be-
half.9 When no agreement can be reached, an arbitration body may, in
some Member States, rule on the arrangements to be made for the
workers. 10
The trend toward greater worker participation in business deci-
sions is reflected in recent Community developments. A European
5 Council Directive of Feb. 17, 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to collective redundancies, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975).
6 Id at 29, 30, arts. 2, 3.
7 Council Directive of Feb. 14, 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, busi-
nesses or parts of businesses, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 61) 26 (1977).
8 Id at 27, 28, art. 6, para. 1.
9 Id at 28, art. 6, para. 2.
10 This is the case in Member States whose laws, regulations or administrative provisions pro-
vide that "representatives of the employees may have recourse to an arbitration board to obtain a
decision on the measures to be taken in relation to employees .... Id at art. 6, para. 3.
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card index of collective agreements is presently under preparation. In
addition, joint sectoral committees have been set up to allow represent-
atives of employers and labor in certain industrial sectors to meet for
the purpose of concluding Community-wide collective agreements.
The joint committees will also provide a channel through which to deal
with certain problems posed by multinational companies.
As part of its policy to harmonize company law in the Community,
the Commission has proposed that any firm employing more than 500
persons be required to establish a supervisory board on which employ-
ees are represented. The supervisory board would be charged with ap-
pointing, controlling, and if necessary, dismissing, the members of the
board of management. In addition, it would be required to approve
decisions of major importance to the company." This same mecha-
nism would also apply to firms which, by reason of their international
activities, elect the status of "European Company" along the lines of
the proposed European Company Statute.'
2
INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE WORKERS
The composition and powers of worker-represented bodies vary
enormously among the Member States. Generally workers are in-
formed and consulted on management decisions within their own firms
through locally represented councils.' 3 However, in some cases,
worker-represented bodies within a firm also have a right of
codetermination, in that such bodies must be called upon to approve or
disapprove management decisions.' 4 The various means by which
workers are informed, consulted and sometimes induced to accept or
reject management proposals involve issues in the "social" field which
directly affect the individual worker.' 5
11 Proposition d'une cinqui6me directive tendant i coordonner les garanties qui sont exig6es
dans les Etats membres, des socidt6s, au sens de 'article 58 paragraphe 2 du traitd, pour prot6ger
les int6rets, tant des associ6s que des tiers en ce qui concerne la structure des societ6s anonymes
ainsi que les pourvoirs et obligations de leurs organes. 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972).
12 S. E. Proposal, supra note 3, at 42.
13 See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
14 See, e.g., discussion of German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz in W. KOLVENBACH (1978), supra
note 2, at 117.
15 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972). The Commission has subsequently indicated
that a transition period may be needed for the eventual adoption of this proposal. See Green
Paper, supra note 2, at 40. This appears also to be the opinion of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. See Opinion on the employee participation and company structure in the European Com-
munity, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 94) 2 (1979) and the subsequent Report, id at 4. See also
Conlon, note 2 supra. The social field includes such matters as changes in production methods,
machinery changes, workshop rules, safety and health measures, and pension rules.
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Worker participation generally operates at the local plant level.
Worker representation at the local level is essential for both labor and
management if decisions affecting workers are to be applied with a
minimal amount of friction. Furthermore, worker representation at the
local level is important for the economic decision-making process, since
this mechanism is particularly suitable for acquainting management
with the concerns and ideas of the workers and vice versa. The effec-
tiveness of worker participation in the decision-making process seems
to depend largely upon the existence of institutions able to centralize
the views and wishes of the people they represent while retaining their
close links with those people.
Despite the advantages of worker representation at the local level,
these bodies tend to have only a fragmentary view of decisions which
affect the firm as a whole. Thus, worker participation at the plant level
is particularly unsuited for decisions affecting the whole firm. It is pos-
sible to envisage the creation within a firm of a committee composed of
workers' representatives elected directly or indirectly within the repre-
sentative institutions at the works or plant level. Since such a commit-
tee would be distinct from the company's decision-making bodies,
however, its effectiveness is open to question. If, on the other hand,
such a committee were given major legal powers over the firm's eco-
nomic decision-making process, as, for example, a right of veto, there
would be a danger of paralyzing the firm. Thus, if workers are to have
an opportunity to influence the decision-making process of an entire
firm, representative bodies must be backed by other institutions. 16
The Community has already adopted and proposed a number of
measures requiring governing bodies of companies employing a given
number of persons to inform and consult workers' representatives and,
if possible, to negotiate agreements with them. The Draft European
Company Statute, for example, contains provisions requiring the infor-
mation and consultation of the European Works Council on a number
of questions and, in some cases, a decision may be taken by the gov-
erning bodies only with that Council's consent.' 7 Directives which con-
tain provisions regarding workers' representative bodies include: a
Directive regarding mass dismissals,'" a recently-adopted Directive on
acquired rights of workers, 19 and a Draft Directive on the protection of
the interests of members and other parties in mergers of joint-stock
16 See, ag., the institutions discussed in the Green Paper, supra note 2, at 21-31.
17 S. E. Proposal, supra note 3, at 62-65.
18 See Directive of Feb. 17, 1975, supra note 5, at 29-30.
19 See Directive of Feb. 14, 1977, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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companies.2 °
PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF
UNDERTAKINGS WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN
PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL FIRMS: PROPOSAL
FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
At the instigation of former Commissioner for Social Affairs Henk
Vredeling, the Commission approved a proposal for a Council Direc-
tive aimed at ensuring the application of satisfactory procedures for
informing and consulting employees in undertakings operating several
establishments or more than one subsidiary in a Member State (herein-
after referred to as the "proposal to inform employees").2 This propo-
sal also covers transnational firms whose decision-making center lies
outside the Community.22 Employees covered by the Directive would
have the right to be informed and consulted regarding management
decisions affecting the work force as a whole.2 3
The text of the proposed Directive, which was drawn up after con-
sultation with industry-wide groups reflecting labor and management
(the ETUC24 and UNICE25), will be sent to the European Parliament
20 See Proposition relative A une troisi~me directive tendant A coordonner les garanties qui
sont exig6es dans les Etats membres des soci6tks au sens de l'article 58 paragraphe 2 du trait6 pour
prot6ger les int6rdts, tant des associ6s que des tiers, en ce qui concerne les fusions des soci6t6s
anonymes, 15 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 129) 53, 55 (1972), which amends an earlier proposal
published at 13 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 89) 20 (1970).
21 Proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employees
of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings, 23 0. J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Proposal]. These articles apply specifically to
"undertakings with complex structures whose decision-making centre is located in the country in
which the employees work." Id at 6-7, arts. 10-14. In addition to the Community measures
mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the text, the proposal supplements, see the Directives of
Mar. 9, 1968 (first directive on company law), 11 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 65) (1968); Dec. 13,
1976 (second directive on company law), 20 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1 (1977); Oct. 9, 1978
(third directive on company law), 21 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978); July 25, 1978
(fourth directive in company law), 21 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978); and Mar. 17, 1980
(directive on listing particulars), 23 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 100) 1 (1980), which require certain
companies established under the law of a Member State to disclose information on their affairs.
See also the proposal for a seventh directive (amended proposal for a seventh directive concerning
group accounts), 22 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 14) 2 (1979), and the proposal concerning publica-
tion of information on a regular basis (proposal of Jan. 19, 1979 for a directive on information to
be published on a regular basis), 22 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 29) 5 (1979).
22 See Proposal, supra note 21, at 4-6, arts. 4-9.
23 Id at 4, 6, arts. 5, 11.
24 For a study of the European Trade Union Confederation, see E. KIRCHNER, TRADE UN-
IONS AS A PRESSURE GROUP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1977).
25 The Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) is a Belgian-based group




and the Economic and Social Committee for their opinions. The Com-
mission will maintain contact with these bodies and will clarify, or, if
necessary, amend its proposal in the light of the opinions expressed.
The Commission will most likely participate actively within the frame-
work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the International Labor Organization to ensure that multinationals
originating outside the Community are subject to the same obligations
as those whose decision-making centers lie within the Community.
Problems the Proposed Directive Must Address
The procedures for informing and consulting employees often do
not keep pace with the changing structures of the firms. Despite the
increasing complexity within multinational firms, their employees con-
tinue to be informed and consulted only at the lowest organizational
unit (e.g., shop, sector of activity or works). Thus, decisions which may
have serious repercussions for employees at the local level may well
have been considered and adopted at a much higher level within the
same country or even abroad. Local management may be ignorant of
the motives behind many such decisions. Disclosure of information to
employees, however, generally is still confined to the affairs within a
local business entity, resulting in the workers' obtaining only a partial
or even incorrect picture of the affairs of the firm as a whole.
This situation has particularly serious implications for employees
of firms operating in several countries, since the application of labor
laws-particularly laws relating to employees' representative bodies-
is usually confined to the territory of a given country. The powers of
these employee bodies, similar to those of a trade union, do not nor-
mally extend beyond national frontiers. Thus, procedures by which
employees in a given country are informed or consulted only have ef-
fect within the legal framework of that country.
Information should be supplied to employers in each Member
State concerning their company's transnational operations so that em-
ployees have a picture of the performance of the concern as a whole.
There is a need for provisions within the Directive enabling employees'
representatives to approach company managers in another country
when that management alone is in a position to inform and consult
with the representatives.
Similar information and consultation problems can arise witlhin
firms operating exclusively at the national level when procedures for
informing and consulting employees are inconsistent with the structure
of the entity whose decisions affect the employees' interests. For exam-
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ple, a firm which expands its business operations by opening a number
of establishments throughout the country will experience information
problems with its employees if the bodies representing its employees
continue to operate only at the local level. More typically, a dominant
undertaking may have several subsidiaries in the same country while
the bodies representing its employees are organized exclusively at the
local level. There is a need for provisions requiring managers of these
subsidiaries to inform and consult their employees about decisions
taken at a higher level which affect the employees' interests. There
should be channels available whereby employee representatives can
approach central management if that management alone is in a posi-
tion to inform and consult the employees in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Directive.
In a Community in which national economies are closely inter-
linked and in which undertakings are undergoing structural changes by
availing themselves of the right of establishment guaranteed by the
EEC Treaty, it is essential that all undertakings with a sizeable work
force and a relatively complex structure, in particular those operating
on a transnational basis, should operate under identical legal rights and
obligations. A legal framework for the disclosure of information and
the consultation of employees would, therefore, constitute a stepping
stone for the creation of a uniform operating environment for all un-
dertakings within the Community. The current economic climate,
which has necessitated far-reaching and difficult structural changes in
industry therefore resulting in serious social repercussions, highlights
the importance of a Community initiative in this field. Against this
background, the requirement that all firms should inform and consult
their employees on the basis of their overall operations assumes partic-
ular importance.
In order to eliminate any discrimination in practice the Commis-
sion should take steps to ensure the imposition of similar obligations on
undertakings from non-member countries that apply to Community
undertakings. This proposal to inform employees should be examined
in light of the Council Directives of February 17, 1975 and February
14, 1977,26 which include provisions establishing compulsory proce-
dures for informing and consulting employee representatives within in-
dividual Member States in the event of collective redundancies or
transfers of businesses.
26 See Directive of Feb. 17, 1975, supra note 5, at 30, art. 2; Directive of Feb. 14, 1977, supra
note 7, at art. 6.
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Provisions of the Proposed Directive
The proposed Community rules fall into two distinct parts: one is
intended to apply to transnational undertakings, 7 and the other will
cover undertakings which have several establishments and/or subsidi-
aries within a single country.2" The two parts are parallel in substance,
distinguishing between the decision-making center or dominant under-
taking on the one hand, and establishments or subsidiaries subject to
the former's authority on the other.
At least bi-annually, the management of the dominant undertak-
ing will be required to forward to the management of its Community
subsidiaries relevant information regarding activities which concern
the firm as a whole. Specifically, management must convey informa-
tion regarding: structure and manning; the economic and financial sit-
uation; the probable development of the business, production and sales;
employment trends; production and investment programs; rationaliza-
tion plans; manufacturing and working methods, in particular the in-
troduction of new working methods; and all procedures and plans
liable to have a substantial effect on the employees' interests.29 This
itemization is the same list proposed by the Commission in its Draft
Regulation establishing a statute for European companies,30 and fur-
thermore, corresponds to the provisions of national legislation in Mem-
ber States which are most advanced in this field.3'
The management of each subsidiary employing at least one hun-
dred people, under the proposal, is obligated to communicate informa-
tion received from the dominant undertaking without delay to the
employees' representatives. If the management of a subsidiary is un-
able to supply the required information, then employees' representa-
tives may request this information directly from the dominant
undertaking's management.3 2 Employee representatives will be under
a duty under the proposed Directive to take account of the interests of
the undertaking in communicating information to third parties and to
refrain from divulging secrets regarding the undertaking or its
business. 33
The proposed Directive provides for consultation procedures when
27 Proposal, supra note 21, at 4-6, arts. 4-9.
28 Id at 6-7, arts. 10-14.
29 Id at 4, 6, arts. 4, 11.
30 See S. E. Proposal, supra note 3, at 62, art. 120.
31 See, eag., Green Paper, supra note 2, at 49 (Belgium), 86 (Luxembourg).
32 Proposal, supra note 21, at 5 (art. 5, paras. 3, 4), 6 (art. 11, paras. 3, 4).
33 Id at 8, art. 15.
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the dominant undertaking or subsidiary makes a decision likely to have
a substantial effect on the interests of its workers. In such cases, man-
agement of the dominant undertaking is required to forward precise
information to the management of each of the firm's subsidiaries within
the Community forty days before implementing the decision, providing
details of the basis for the proposed decision and the legal, economic
and social consequences of the decision for the employees concerned.34
Decisions falling under this provision include: (a) the closure or trans-
fer of the whole or major parts of an establishment; (b) restrictions,
extensions or substantial modifications to the activities of the undertak-
ing; (c) major modifications with regard to organizations; (d) the in-
troduction of long-term cooperation with other undertakings or the
cessation of such cooperation.35
The management of each subsidiary employing at least one hun-
dred people under the proposal is required to communicate this infor-
mation without delay to the representatives of its employees and
further, must ask for the employees' opinion within a period of not less
than 30 days. If, in the opinion of the employees' representatives, the
proposed decision is deemed likely to have a direct effect on terms of
employment or working conditions, then the management of the sub-
sidiary is required to hold consultations with the employees' represent-
atives in an effort to reach an agreement on the firm's plans. In the
event that the subsidiary's management fails to arrange such consulta-
tions, the employees' representatives are authorized to open consulta-
tions with the management of the dominant firm through mandated
delegates.36 When management of a transnational undertaking whose
decision-making center is located outside the Community fails to en-
sure that at least one person within the Community can fulfill require-
ments regarding disclosure of information and consultation laid down
by the Directive, then management of the subsidiary employing the
largest number of workers within the Community will be held responsi-
ble for fulfilling these requirements.37
The proposed Directive provides for the disclosure of information
to, and consultation with, an organization representing all the employ-
ees of the dominant undertaking and its subsidiaries within the Com-
munity as established by means of agreements concluded between
34 Id at 5 (art. 6, para. 1), 6-7 (art. 12, para. 1).
35 Id at 5 (art. 6, para. 2), 7 (art. 12, para. 2).
36 Id at 5 (art. 6, paras. 3-5), 7 (art. 12, paras. 3-5).
37 Id at 5-6, art. 8.
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central management and the employees' representatives. 38 The Mem-
ber States have the authority to decide how employees' representatives
are appointed. The nature of the organization responsible for repre-
senting employees will also be determined by the Member States' dis-
cretion. The representative body might take the form of a central or
group works council, a local works council, or a shop stewards commit-
tee. The proposal does, however, stipulate that within a Member State
if a body representing employees exists at a level higher than that of the
individual subsidiary or establishment (for example, at the level of the
firm as a whole), then the employees concerned must be informed and
consulted at this higher level.39 Member States under the proposal are
obligated to recognize a body representing all the employees of the
dominant undertaking and its subsidiaries in the Community which is
established by means of agreements concluded between management,
at the level of the decision-making center, and the employees'
representatives.
PRELIMINARY POSITION OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE IN BELGIUM
Business circles in Europe are concerned by the sweeping nature of
the proposed Directive. UNICE4 and the American Chamber of
Commerce in Belgium (hereinafter referred to as "AMCHAM") are
presently engaged in discussion with representatives of the Commission
regarding areas of concern. AMCHAM, an organization composed of
large American corporations conducting business in Belgium has ex-
pressed the following concerns regarding portions of the proposed
Directive.41
Necessity for Commission Action
American business is firmly committed to the principle of good
"corporate citizenship." It has often supported the existence of volun-
tary guidelines concerning various areas of corporate activity in order
both to determine a framework for its own activities and to strengthen
the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and other interests.
Nonetheless, American business is concerned that unnecessary duplica-
tion of legislation may adversely affect the conduct of its operations
and thus should be avoided.
38 Id at 5, 7, arts. 7, 13.
39 Id
40 See note 25 supra.
41 See Proposal, supra note 21, at 4-6, arts. 4-9.
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The voluntary Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adopted
in 1976 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Develop-
ment (OECD), recommend extensive public disclosure regarding the
international structure and operations of multinational enterprises.42
These guidelines also recommend that management of such firms give
reasonable notice to the workers regarding decisions which would ad-
versely affect their welfare and further consult with labor to mitigate
the effects of such decisions.43
In their 1979 review of the first three years of operation of the
OECD Guidelines,' the OECD members (including EEC Member
States) concluded that the initial results under the voluntary guidelines
were encouraging, that their application should be continued, and fur-
thermore, that they may well prove successful. Implementation of obli-
gatory rules would only conflict with the previously expressed desires
of the OECD members and therefore jeopardize the success of the
promising voluntary programs.
Obligatory rules would also be imposed without the consensus of
either labor or management, which in AMCHAM's view is imperative
for harmonious cooperation and ultimately a successful result. Up to
this time there has been no effort to obtain such a consensus. In addi-
tion, American business questions the utility of this particular Commis-
sion initiative because the Community has either already acted in the
major areas of concern or will do so shortly.
Information
Many of the disclosure obligations contained in this proposed Di-
rective are already covered by the proposed Seventh Council Directive
Concerning Group Accounts, as amended.45 Many of the points raised
in the AMCHAM memorandum of September 13, 1979 concerning the
Seventh Council Directive received a favorable response from the
Commission. Although there are still a few technical questions which
remain (for example, whether group accounts as required for U.S. pur-
42 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION BY
THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS OF THE OECD COUNCIL ON
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976) 14 (Disclosure of Information) [hereinaf-
ter cited as OECD GUIDELINES]. For a preliminary assessment of the effect of the Guidelines, see
Maher, Supranational Regimesfor Multinationals: The New Order With a New Face?, 4 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 289 (1979).
43 See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 16-17 (Employment and Industrial Relations).
44 Article V of the 1976 Declaration required the OECD members to review the effectiveness
of the Guidelines within three years of their publication. See id at 9. 1
45 See Amended proposal for a Seventh Directive pursuant to Article 54 (3)(g) of the EEC
Treaty Concerning Group Accounts, 22 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 14) 2,passin (1979).
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poses will be sufficiently "comparable" for EEC use), by and large
American business now supports the adoption of the proposed Seventh
Directive, with the belief that it will obviate the necessity for most of
the disclosure requirements envisioned by this new proposal.
Virtually all of the EEC Member States currently have legislation
requiring disclosure regarding certain information to the workers.
Similarly, many American corporations are required under U.S. law to
disclose substantial information regarding their worldwide activities to
various regulatory agencies, in particular the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Such information is available to workers, and indeed to
the public in general. If adopted, Article 5 of the proposed Directive4 6
will mandate additional disclosure. In actuality, however, the informa-
tion that the proposed Directive will require corporations to disclose is
already available in a different form. Thus, particularly when complex
corporate structures are involved, this will result in a greater cost of
compliance and little benefit to the public or employees.
Most large American corporations presently transmit firm-wide
data to the management of their subsidiaries for their personnel al-
though such reports may not concern all subsidiaries every time. Thus,
most transnational firms are voluntarily complying with the proposed
mandate of Article 5, paragraph 1 which would require management at
the dominant firm every six months to provide "relevant information"
to all subsidiaries.47 However, this requirement raises questions re-
garding enforcement since it would appear difficult legally to compel a
parent company to communicate information on the activities of its
subsidiaries located outside the EEC.48
Article 5, paragraph 2(b), imposes vague and possibly excessive
requirements by requiring the dominant firm to relate financial and
economic information to all subsidiaries.49 Annual reports are already
communicated firm-wide by both European and American companies.
Quarterly activity reviews are organized by many American companies
for the firm personnel, and in addition are provided to U.S. regulatory
agencies.
Paragraph 2(c) of Article 5 also poses problems in that it requires
46 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
47 "At least every six months, the management of a dominant undertaking shall forward rele-
vant information to the management of its subsidiaries in the Community giving a clear picture of
the activities of the dominant undertaking and its subsidiaries taken as a whole." Proposal, supra
note 21, at 4.
48 One should perhaps revise the definition of "subsidiary" in Article 3, para. 2.
49 "[The information required by Article 5, para. I] shall relate in particular to:. . . (b) the
economic and financial situation." Proposal, supra note 21, at 4.
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the release of probable development trends for production and sales.50
Businesses may reasonably object to divulging "prospects" of matters
such as business, production and sales. Matters of this sort are in the
domain of expectation or even speculation, and their premature publi-
cation might generate unfortunate results for persons relying upon the
information. Furthermore, this requirement could conceivably violate
U.S. securities laws concerning the manipulation of securities markets
through means of issuing speculations or projections. Business matters
regarding production and sales are often considered highly confidential
and generally are not disclosed to anyone outside management.
Article 5, paragraph 2(d), directly concerns personnel and requires
the release of information regarding probable employment trends.5'
As previously mentioned, information regarding probabilities can pres-
ent difficulties when personnel treat the information as fact or misinter-
pret the predictions. Thus, such information may generate conflicts
and tensions within an enterprise at a time when the problem is still too
indefinite to require a firm solution.
Article 5, paragraph 2(e), requires the disclosure of production and
investment plans.52 Production and investment programs are generally
considered confidential and therefore are not disclosed to anyone in
advance. Thus this requirement is particularly disturbing since such
plans reveal sensitive information about the firm's competitive position.
Manufacturing methods, as well as the introduction of new work-
ing methodology,5 3 involve questions of timing. Workers are of neces-
sity informed regarding any new method, but the question is how far in
advance should the workers be notified. The Proposed Draft Directive
offers no guidance regarding this question.
In conclusion, to the extent already contained in other national
and European measures, the disclosure requirements contained in Arti-
cle 5 seem unnecessary. The remaining measures are vague, ill-con-
ceived, and contain no constructive guidelines. Before such measures
are enacted, if at all, various interested parties should negotiate a sys-
tem which is workable, in that it provides useful information while at
the same time is not unduly burdensome.
50 This provision requires management to disclose "the situation and probable development of
the business and of production and sales." Id
51 Management must disclose "the employment situation and probable trends." Id
52 Management must disclose "production and investment program[s]." Id
53 Article 5, para. 2 (g), requires disclosure of information concerning "manufacturing and




The major changes in corporate activity which are of particular
interest to personnel have already been the subject of consultation as a
result of Council Directive No. 75/129 of February 17, 1975 regarding
Collective Dismissals 4 and Council Directive No. 77/187 of February
14, 1977 concerning the Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses, or Parts
of Businesses.15 Thus, it is the view of American business that the pro-
posed legislation contains little which is not already dealt with in ex-
isting or pending Community legislation.
AMCHAM is opposed to any duplication of controls (for example,
this proposal would impose EEC controls in addition to similar na-
tional measures), since this would merely add to the cost of compliance
without providing any overriding benefit to the public. In this regard,
the reports required under Article 6, paragraphs 2(a) and (b)56 of the
proposed Directive would result in needless duplication. Furthermore,
for those changes in corporate activity which are not covered by the
existing Directives, consultation would be required under Article 12(1)
of the Proposed Fifth Directive Concerning the Structure of Corpora-
tions and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs.57 Even without
further legislation, substantial changes in organization" or working
conditions59 are already dealt with under the collective bargaining pro-
cess. From the comments of British Labor representatives at the recent
hearings held by the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, it
appears that some labor representatives prefer to rely on national col-
lective bargaining rather than on joint consultation, agreement, and
responsibility.
Article 6, paragraph 4, of the proposed Directive requires "consul-
54 See note 5 supra.
55 See note 7 supra.
56 The decisions [about which management must forward information to employees] shall
be those relating to:
(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts thereof;
(b) restrictions, extensions or substantial modifications to the activities of the
undertaking.
57 See Proposition, supra note 11, at 52. This provision would require management (lPorgane
de direction) to obtain the approval of the supervisory board (l'organe de surveillance) for deci-
sions nearly identical to those discussed in the text accompanying note 34 supra.
58 Article 6, para. 2(c), of the proposed directive would require that management give advance
notice to workers of "major modifications with regard to organization." Proposal, supra note 21,
at 5.
59 Article 6, para. 4, would give workers the right to consult with management on decisions
which the workers feel would be "likely to have a direct effect on employees' terms of employment
or working conditions." Id
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tation,"6 ° but in no way defines the concept. Experience indicates that
it is not easy to know when the duty to consult has been fulfilled. To
avoid conflicts on this crucial point, some definition of the term "con-
sultation" should be provided.
One major question remains regarding Article 6 paragraph 5 of
the proposed Directive which internationalizes the ultimate collective
bargaining process beyond what appears to be either management or
labor union desires.6" AMCHAM's position is that the most acceptable
path to reform is by means of voluntary guidelines and through the
harmonization of Member States' corporate laws. These methods leave
in place the supremacy of national laws and customs without forcing
on business an international consultation to which there is considerable
resistance in both management and labor circles.
Discrimination
The desire to ensure neutral treatment of all companies, and thus
avoid discrimination, is an essential benefit which international codes
of conduct can confer on multinational corporations. It is indisputable
that nondiscrimination and national treatment are among the funda-
mental tenets of the Community order.
The proposal for a European Company contains requirements for
consultation similar to those in the proposed directive. However, the
present proposal would result in obligatory requirements for all mul-
tinational and multi-site companies. Such is not the case with the Eu-
ropean Company Statute,62 which is a voluntary organizational plan.
Once this Proposal becomes effective, then companies can weigh the
consultation requirements in their decision to opt for status as a Euro-
pean Company. Under the proposed Directive all firms would be re-
quired to meet consultation requirements.
In the Proposed Directive, single unit companies, regardless of
size, escape the necessity to produce information which otherwise must
be disclosed. In addition, it may prove impossible to enforce Articles 8
and 5(4),63 which require the subsidiary to provide information when
60 See note 59 supra.
61 "Where the management of the subsidiaries does not communicate to the employees' repre-
sentatives the information required. . . or does not arrange consultations as required... , such
representatives shall be authorized to open consultations, through authorized delegates, with the
management of the dominant undertaking with a view to obtaining such information and, where
appropriate, to reaching agreement on the measures planned with regard to the employees con-
cerned." Proposal, supra note 21, at 5.
62 See S. E. Proposal, supra note 3, at 63-64, art. 125.
63 Article 8 states that:
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the "dominant company" refuses to comply, thus resulting in discrimi-
nation against those subsidiaries and dominant companies which vol-
untarily comply.
Effect as Precedent
The principle of voluntary compliance is a key element of the
OECD Guidelines.6 Abandonment of this principle by the EEC might
serve as a precedent for third world countries to include mandatory
codes of conduct. Such obligatory codes of conduct could make it con-
siderably more difficult for EEC-based companies to do business in the
developing world and furthermore could have adverse effects on man-
power requirements and the number of jobs provided by such compa-
nies within the Community.
Confidentiality
To extend the requirement of disclosure and consultation to confi-
dential management information could pose serious security problems.
Article 15, paragraph 1 of the proposed Directive refers to the possible
breach by labor representatives of confidential information which they
may obtain;65 in certain recent experiences involving Member State
legislation, this has been more than a theoretical problem. The pro-
posed Directive leaves it to Member States to propose sanctions.66
Prior to enacting such a Draft Directive, specific guidelines regarding
sanctions should be discussed and inserted. Article 15, paragraphs 2
and 3, are wholly insufficient as drafted.67
CONCLUSION
Although the development of social legislation is an important
Where the management of the dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is lo-
cated outside the Community and which controls one or more subsidiaries in the Community
does not ensure the presence within the Community of a [sic] least one person able to fulfill
the requirements as regards disclosure of information and consultation laid down by this
Directive, the management of the subsidiary that employs the largest number of employees
within the Commumty shall be responsible for fulfilling the obligations imposed on the man-
agement of the dominant undertaking by this Directive.
Proposal, suipra note 21, at 5-6.
64 See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 12, para. 6.
65 See Proposal, .supra note 21, at 8.
66 Id at art. 15, paras. 2, 3.
67 Article 15, paras. 2 and 3, read as follows:
2. The Member States shall empower a tribunal or other national body to settle disputes
concerning the confidentiality of certain information.
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Community initiative, the Commission must recognize that legislating
broad social provisions which affect the operations of national and
multinational corporations is a responsibility which must be carefully
exercised to arrive at a plan which takes into consideration the many
possible ramifications of the legislation. If past labor experience in the
United States and other industrialized countries outside the EEC is in-
dicative of future trends, then the Community program may well serve
as a frame of reference in this area. It is of utmost importance that the
steps taken at this point do not become stumbling blocks in years to
come.
The proposed Directive as now presented seems ill-advised in that
it brings very little which is not already provided by existing or pro-
posed legislation. Furthermore, the proposal is discriminatory, techni-
cally incomplete, and could serve as an unhappy precedent for
legislation in other areas.
